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extant literature developed two alternative explanation: 1) 
the long-term perspective hypothesis and 2) the mana-
gerial opportunism hypothesis (Choi et al., 2013; Ehsan 
et al., 2020; Gras-Gil et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2021). 
Some studies (Almahrog et  al., 2018; Ben Amar & 
Chakroun, 2018; Chen & Hung, 2021; Gras-Gil et  al., 
2016; Martinez-Martinez et  al., 2021; Choi et  al., 2021) 
contend that CSR active firms are concentrated not just 
on raising the level of profits but also on nurturing pro-
spective relationships with stakeholders (the long-term 
perspective hypothesis) (Choi et  al., 2013). These com-
panies are assumed, should behave responsible as well in 
reporting the accounting information. In favour of this 
perspective, empirical investigations reveal that commit-
ted to and active in CSR companies supply more compre-
hensive financial disclosures and engage less in earnings 
management (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Chen & Hung, 2021; 
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Abstract. This paper investigates whether corporate social responsibility active (CSR active) firms operate dissimilarly 
from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we examine whether the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
attitude of a firm sways its reporting incentives, in respect of the extent of earning management. To test our predictions, 
we use a sample of 25,861 year-company observations, corresponding to 3538 Chinese listed companies, for the period 
2009–2019. We find a significant positive association between CSR activity and earning management assessed by the level 
of discretionary accruals in Chinese listed companies. Moreover, we document that Chinese CSR active firms engage more 
in earnings management through discretionary accruals than CSR inactive firms. These findings are consistent with the 
opportunistic financial reporting hypothesis: advances in CSR used by managers to safeguard their position by evading 
scrutiny from stakeholder activists. This study contributes to the growing awareness among investors, stakeholders and 
researchers that we should distinguish between CSR active firms and socially responsible firms and that being the latter 
entail something more than just mechanically produce CSR reports. 
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Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is on the way to be-
coming one of the main practices of modern companies 
as more and more companies under the pressure from 
stakeholders adopt and apply CSR disclosure practice 
(Adams, 2020; Gazzola et al., 2019; KPMG, 2020). Cor-
porate social responsibility is trending upwards both in 
academic research (Zengul et al., 2021; Pasko et al., 2021) 
and in corporate practice (KPMG, 2020). The KPMG re-
ports that the CSR reporting rate worldwide is up to 96 
per cent (compared to 45 per cent in 2002) in big com-
panies and 80 per cent (18 per cent) in the rest of the 
companies (KPMG, 2020, p. 10). Such a dramatic trans-
formation of CSR into the practice of the majority begs 
the question of how sincere are the companies (through 
its senior management) in adaption of CSR practice. The 
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Cho & Chun, 2016; Gras-Gil et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2012). 
On the contrary, other scholars put forward the sug-
gestion that managers might deliberately resort to CSR to 
conceal their opportunistic behaviours (the managerial 
opportunism hypothesis) (Choi et  al., 2013; Kim et  al., 
2012). Advances in CSR could assist the managers to safe-
guard his or her job by evading scrutiny from stakeholder 
activists (Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Muriithi et  al., 2021). 
Moreover, a settled partnership with stakeholders can be 
employed as an entrenchment mechanism by managers to 
fight off any hostile takeovers (Arthur et al., 2019; Muriithi 
et  al., 2021). Therefore, the managers who pursue their 
private rewards through distorting earnings information 
have incentives to be CSR active to protect their entrench-
ment (Choi et al., 2013). Thus, according to the manage-
rial opportunism hypothesis CSR engagement is utilized 
as an efficacious strategy by a firm’s managers to cover up 
their involvement in earning management (EM) practices 
(Choi et al., 2013; Ehsan et al., 2020). 
In view of the fact that the empirical results are incon-
clusive at best, more studies are necessary to comprehend 
how CSR orientation can affect corporate reporting qual-
ity through lessening EM practice (Almahrog et al., 2018; 
Ben Amar & Chakroun, 2018; Choi et al., 2013; Prior et al., 
2008). We scrutinize whether CSR active firms conduct 
appropriately in financial disclosures area through con-
straining earnings management, thereby delivering more 
transparent and reliable financial information (the behav-
iour suits CSR active firms well) as contrasted with CSR 
inactive enterprises. Furthermore, although prior studies 
on this topic have concentrated on various institutional 
settings, jurisdictions and their mix, our paper bridges this 
gap of the existing literature through investigating the ef-
fects of CSR orientation on EM in China jurisdiction with 
ever-growing impact on the world economy.
Earning management is used by us following previous 
studies as a litmus test in determining the firms’ devo-
tion to the CSR as EM is seen as an agency cost because 
managers pursue their own interest to the detriment of 
stakeholders (Scholtens & Kang, 2013). Given that ac-
counting earnings figures are one of the most often cited 
performance statistics and that the executives have some 
leeway in calculating earnings without violating account-
ing standards principles, EM is best suited to ascertain 
the genuineness of manager’s stance towards stakeholders 
and their objectives (Ehsan et al., 2020; Prior et al., 2008). 
Accruals are generally specified as the difference between 
the reported income and the cash flow (Mendes et  al., 
2012). However, a part of accruals is influenced by factors 
beyond the management control (the application of ac-
counting standards) and called non-discretionary accruals 
(NDA) and a part of accruals is intentionally selected by 
management pursuant to its interests in terms of earnings 
and called discretionary accruals (DA) (Chen & Hung, 
2021; Mendes et al., 2012). Discretionary accruals are the 
results of management’s conscious and intentional actions 
and as such is an excellent marker of management’s adher-
ence to CSR principles.   
In our empirical analyses, we use a sample of 25,861 
year-company observations of Chinese listed companies 
covering a period from 2009 to 2019. From a regression 
analysis of the data, followed by robustness tests, we find 
a positive association between CSR and the extent of earn-
ing management measured by discretionary accruals. Our 
findings indicate that active CSR firms are more likely to 
be involved in earnings management. We document that 
active in CSR have a higher level of discretional accruals 
compared with CSR inactive firms. Our findings lend sup-
port to the managerial opportunism hypothesis.
Our study contributes to the literature on CSR and 
EM in several ways. First, we provide empirical evidence 
based on the healthy size of the sample covering ten years 
that Chinese firms’ managers mostly utilize CSR disclo-
sures to conceal their opportunistic behaviour displaying 
bigger compared to CSR non-active firms extent of EM 
measured by discretionary accruals. Doing so this paper 
further extends the field studies on the subject matter 
on Asian countries that are not referred to as much as 
their western counterparts. Moreover, institutional theory 
teaches us that research results in different institutional 
settings may differ due to differences in reporting incen-
tives, enforcement regimes and institutional complemen-
tarities (Wysocki, 2011), thus country-specific studies are 
warranted. Second, this paper provides an alert signal to 
policymakers and stakeholders alike that specific practices 
intended to enhance a firm’s CSR might be just a tool for 
the concealment of other unscrupulous practices. Third, 
this study contributes to the growing awareness among 
stakeholders and researchers (Foster, 2021) that we ought 
to distinguish between active CSR firms and socially re-
sponsible firms and that being the latter entails something 
more than just mechanically copycat others and produce 
CSR reports.  
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as fol-
lows. We review theories explicating the subject matter, 
analyse earlier research and provide the rationales for our 
hypothesis in section 1. Section 2 deals with the institu-
tional background to the study, depicting CSR in China. 
This is followed by a “Research design” section describing 
the sample, variables, and empirical model to be tested. 
The fourth section presents the empirical results obtained. 
The final section of the paper illustrates the main conclu-
sions of this study and provide a discussion of the signifi-
cance of the results.
1. Theoretical background, literature review and 
hypothesis development
Theoretical background on the relationship between CSR 
and EM is represented by several theories, and almost 
each of these theories can, depending on the stance taken, 
explain these relationships in both negative and positive 
light.
Stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is believed 
to be an accepted paradigm to explain why companies 
engage in a socially responsible activity (Almahrog et al., 
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2018; Gras-Gil et al., 2016). The main idea behind stake-
holder theory that ceteris paribus, firms that practising 
stakeholder management will perform better in profitabil-
ity, stability and growth (Gras-Gil et al., 2016, p. 290). In 
this regards, CSR active firms are inclined to foster long-
term relationships with stakeholders rather than maxi-
mize their short-term profit and thus, “providing quality 
earnings is closely connected to CSR activities, especially 
in the aim to meet the needs of the stakeholders” (Choi 
et al., 2013; Gras-Gil et al., 2016). However, others authors 
(Almahrog et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2010) assume “a positive 
relationship between EM and CSR in the stakeholder the-
ory framework” (Almahrog et al., 2018, p. 314). Managers 
seek to serve a multilateral set of stakeholders’ objectives, 
while in information asymmetry which arises managers 
find room to practice EM. Moreover, (Almahrog et  al., 
2018) cite findings of (Gargouri et  al., 2010; Sun et  al., 
2010) which testify that “companies that engage in CSR to 
negotiate diverse stakeholders interests are inadvertently 
expected to practice EM” (Almahrog et al., 2018, p. 314).
Signalling theory. The fact that CSR disclosure is re-
ported in form of a stand-alone report as one aspect of 
CSR activities is evidence that firms are signalling to the 
market that they have some positive information to re-
veal. High CSR performers chose to disclose CSR related 
information to the public signalling their quality as signal-
ling involves mostly quality aspect (Connelly et al., 2011). 
In contrast, low-quality firms in terms of CSR choose the 
non-disclosure route, which “consistent with constrained 
accounting information” (Sun et  al., 2010, p. 683). Al-
though, from a manager’s standpoint, CSR activity is a 
signal that deflects shareholders’ awareness from matters 
on which managers might be disciplined (García-Sánchez 
& García-Meca, 2017; Gras-Gil et  al., 2016; Kolsi & At-
tayah, 2018).
Agency theory. Agency theory based on the assump-
tion the information asymmetry between managers and 
stakeholder is high. The information asymmetry provides 
managers with an opportunity to practice EM. Earnings 
management is viewed as an agency cost because manag-
ers pursue their own interests by window-dressing finan-
cial reports that do not correspond to the real situation of 
the firms (Almahrog et al., 2018; Scholtens & Kang, 2013). 
CSR activity implies a reduction in the level of informa-
tion asymmetry and thus should raise the risk for man-
agers to be caught red-handed in EM, therefore, agency 
theory implies a negative relationship between CSR and 
EM.
Stewardship theory. Stewardship theory as reported 
by (Prior et al., 2008) supports the managerial opportun-
ism hypothesis. According to stewardship theory, a stew-
ard is expected to behave in a pro organizational manner 
and displaying collectivist behaviours. A genuine stew-
ard is more satisfied with serving the group as opposed 
to serving himself. Thus, to “benefit all stakeholders, the 
manager – the steward – influences reported earnings” 
(Prior et al., 2008, p. 173).
Stakeholder-agency theory. According to stakeholder-
agency theory managers are seen as unique knowledgeable 
stakeholders who are at the centre of the nexus of con-
tracts. Managers are regarded as agents not shareholders, 
but stakeholders. To monitor management performance 
and lessen information asymmetry especially in the situ-
ation of “stakeholder diffusion” CSR activity in form of 
reporting is seen as a “monitoring structure”. Thus, stake-
holder-agency theory asserts that managers can undertake 
some EM activities seeking to acquire personal gains at the 
expense of other stakeholders. However, stakeholders will 
retort to managers provided their interests are impaired 
by EM practices (Sun et al., 2010). Consequently, manag-
ers are incentivized through it to exercise their control to 
produce more informative and extensive financial reports, 
seeking to lessen threats of being discharged (Almahrog 
et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2010).
Legitimacy theory. Legitimacy theory posits that 
companies are obliged by a “social contract” in which 
they consent to discharge various socially desired activities 
in exchange for the endorsement of their objectives and 
other benefits, and this essentially safeguards their sur-
vival (Pasko et al., 2020; Silva, 2021). Accordingly, firms 
issue CSR reporting seeking to legitimize their role within 
society, and other CSR activities are intended to bolster 
social behaviour by adding more credibility (Almahrog 
et al., 2018). Firms seek every possible undertaking to ac-
centuate their socially acceptable behaviour and by it to 
enhance its legitimacy in eyes of stakeholders. However, 
in terms of EM (Almahrog et al., 2018; García-Sánchez & 
García-Meca, 2017) imply that managers who involved in 
manipulative earnings realize that CSR can be exploited 
to preserve the firm’s legitimacy, in particular in eyes of 
socially sensitive stakeholders (Almahrog et  al., 2018; 
García-Sánchez & García-Meca, 2017).
All these theories could be synthesized by two com-
peting hypotheses about the relationship between finan-
cial transparency (proxied by EM) and CSR depending 
on whether the motivation is determined by a long-term 
perspective or by opportunistic behaviours by managers 
(Choi et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2012). The discourse so far 
engenders a rival hypothesis explicating the relation be-
tween CSR and EM.
One thread of literature, indeed prevalent one, recog-
nize that quality earnings are strongly linked to CSR activ-
ities, in particular in that both try to meet the needs of the 
stakeholders (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013). It 
is believed that CSR active firms are less likely to manage 
earnings since “they do not hide unfavourable earnings 
realisations and, therefore, conduct no EM” (Almahrog 
et  al., 2018, p. 313). Thus, EM is recognized as an irre-
sponsible act that contradicts CSR principles (Almahrog 
et  al., 2018; Choi et  al., 2013). As Bozzolan et al put it 
“while financial transparency and accountability are vital 
not just to shareholders’ understanding of the firm but 
also to all stakeholders, they are also principles that char-
acterize a socially responsible firm” (Bozzolan et al., 2015). 
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This assertion in form of a transparent financial re-
porting hypothesis has been proved in multiple settings 
from individual countries like Taiwan (Chen & Hung, 
2021), Spain (Gras-Gil et  al., 2016; Martinez-Martinez 
et  al., 2021), UK (Almahrog et  al., 2018), France (Ben 
Amar & Chakroun, 2018), Korea (Cho & Chun, 2016) 
to international setting (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Kim et al., 
2012; Scholtens & Kang, 2013) (Table 1). 
In light of the analysis provided above and taking into 
consideration that the majority of the extant literature 
came to similar conclusions (Table 1), we propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Transparent Financial Reporting Hypothesis: A CSR 
active firms are less apt to engage in earnings manage-
ment.
Table 1. Prior studies on the relationship between CSR and earning management
Authors Dependable variables
Independent  








CSR index 3,495 firm-year 
observations of
listed corporations in 
nonfinancial industries 
in Taiwan from 2010 to 
2014
“EM significantly less common among 
firms with better CSR performance but 
common among firms with poorer CSR 










317 Spanish SMEs “the stage of the industry life cycle 
influences the EM-CSR relationship. Only 
for SMEs with stable sales in maturity 
sectors, lower interest in EM can be 
significantly explained by higher CSR 











568 listed companies 
from the EU, 2010-2018
“We find a negative relation between 
earnings management and corporate social 
responsibility, suggesting that managers 
from more socially responsible companies 
have a more ethical behavior and, thus, 





EM (DA) CSR disclosure UK FTSE 350 index 
during the period from 
2008–2010
The “results suggest that firms with 
higher levels of CSR report lower levels of 













CSR 595 French firm-year 
observations firms 
belonging to the CAC-
all-Tradable index during 
the period 2010–2014
“We find a negative impact of CSR on 
earnings management. We find, also, that 
some CSR dimensions negatively impact 
earnings management” (Ben Amar & 






CSR the 100 most reputable 
Spanish companies 
according to the Merco 
index for the period 
2005−2012 
a negative impact of CSR practices on 
earnings management =  firms that are 












listed firms during 
2005–2010
socially responsible firms are significantly 













companies listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) in Bangladesh 
from 2005 to 2009
“Our results suggest a positive relation 
between the level of CSR disclosures 
and earnings management measured by 











observations from the 
EIRIS database covering 
24 different countries 
over the period 2003–
2009
“CSR is
negatively associated with earnings 
management in an international setting” 
(Bozzolan et al., 2015, p. 27)
TFRH
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In contrast, the other thread of literature assumes op-
portunistic use of CSR which infers a positive relation 
between CSR activity and EM. The proponents of such 
an approach believe that earnings management practices 
harm the collective interests of stakeholders and that man-
agers are well aware of it (Dechow et al., 1996; Gargouri 
et al., 2010; Muttakin et al., 2015). The very CSR activity 
shield is applied by managers to “deal with stakeholder 
activism and vigilance” (Prior et al., 2008, p. 160).
Some empirical studies support this hypothesis in 
Bangladesh (Muttakin et al., 2015) and international set-
tings (Gargouri et al., 2010; Prior et al., 2008) (Table 1). 
Prior et al issue a warning that “abrupt improvements in 
a firm’s CSR may be connected to value-destroying prac-
tices like earnings management and that these could even 
reinforce the negative impact of such practices on a firm’s 
returns” (Prior et al., 2008, p. 174).
This debate results in a competing hypothesis on the 
relation between CSR and earnings management:
Opportunistic Financial Reporting Hypothesis: A 
CSR active firms are more apt to engage in earnings man-
agement.
2. Institutional background: CSR in China
Due to the occurrence of numerous scandals related to 
misconduct by Chinese companies in regards to environ-
mental and product safety accidents, CSR in China at the 
beginning of the 2000s has turned to the primary point 
of focus for academia, government, and Chinese firms 
(Noronha et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2019). Oddly enough, 
as Lin suggests the very pervasive impression of Chinese 
corporate irresponsibility “may be a main driver for CSR 
development in China” (Lin, 2010, p. 65).
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is discussed in-
tensely in China since when China has been admitted into 
the WTO in 2001 (Yang et al., 2019), whilst the bulk of 
legislature related initiatives have been undertaken only 
since 2006 (Lee et al., 2017). 
The impression of Chinese corporate irresponsibility 
mentioned by (Lin, 2010) has built up as a result of mul-
tiple discrediting scandals and one which stood out and 
gained international attention is that of the Sanlu Group 
milk scandal that occurred in 2008. To increase the pro-
tein content of the milk powder, the Sanlu Group added 
melamine to it (Yang et  al., 2019). Melamine intake is 
known could lead to kidney stones development and in 
the worst case scenario could bring fatal consequences. 
After discovering these facts Sanlu Group went bankrupt 
but social consequence were much bigger and lasting. 
Firstly, the scandal destroyed consumers’ confidence in 
the whole dairy industry and tarnished the perception of 
products labelled as “made in China”. Secondly, affected 
kids which number is estimated to be more than 300 000 
could produce substantial pressure on the public medical 
system in the longer run (Yang et al., 2019). Furthermore, 
the redundant workers who were instantly left without 
work to feed their families compel the local and national 
Authors Dependable variables
Independent  












CSR 139 firms in ten Asian 
countries included in 
Asian Sustainability 
Rating (ASR) report in 
2009 
(Australia, China, Hong 




“Asian firms with relatively good CSR are 
engaged significantly less with earnings 















from Compustat database 
and KLD social ratings 
from 1991 to 2009
“CSR firms are less likely to engage in 
aggressive
earnings management through 
discretionary accruals and/or real activities 













109 listed firms from 
MJRA-CSID database 
from 2004 to 2005
“CSP dimensions concerning the 
environment and employees are positively 










593 industrial firms 
included in the 2002-
2004 SiRi ProTM
database
“We find a positive impact of earnings 
management practices on CSR; this 
relationship holds for different robustness 
checks” (Prior et al., 2008, p. 160)
OFRH
Note: TFRH − Transparent Financial Reporting Hypothesis; OFRH − Opportunistic Financial Reporting Hypothesis.
End of Table 1
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government to intervene. Thus, the social cost of the scan-
dal was enormous and the whole society has to bear it 
(Yang et al., 2019).
In many respects, 2008 is a watershed year witnessing 
not only growing public awareness due to scandals but 
also first actions mandating CSR reports. In January 2008 
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued a land-
mark “The Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility 
Implementation by the Central-Government-Controlled 
State-Owned Enterprises” (Lee et  al., 2017; Lin, 2010). 
Among the measures cited in the guidelines was that “the 
SOEs may issue periodic CSR reports or sustainability re-
ports” (Lin, 2010, p. 73).
Just after that two biggest stock exchanges (Shanghai 
and Shenzhen) followed suit publishing their announce-
ments which mandate CSR report for some listed compa-
nies. Shanghai Stock Exchange mandated starting from the 
fiscal year 2008 onward to issue CSR reports three types of 
listed firms: 1) firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Index, 2) dual-listed companies, 
firms that list shares overseas, and 3) financial companies. 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange also from the fiscal year 2008 
onward made CSR reports mandatory for firms from the 
Shenzhen 100 index. Besides, all listed on these exchanges 
companies were encouraged to publish and make public 
their CSR reports either (Lee et al., 2017). 
Although the first real steps to establish CSR report-
ing landscape was taken in 2008 the foundation had al-
ready been laid before that in 2006 when the old (first 
adopted in 1994) The Company Law was supplemented by 
the definition of CSR in Article 5 “by stating that CSR is 
an obligation that the companies are obligated to comply 
with to promote social morality and business ethics under 
governmental supervision” (Yang et al., 2019, p. 5).
According to KPMG China’s national rates of sustain-
ability reporting, 2020 is 78 per cent (for big companies) 
and up 5 per cent from the 2017 level (KPMG, 2020, 
Figure 1. The number of CSR reports released by Chinese listed 
firms in a fiscal year (source: prepared by authors based on 
RKS information)
p. 15). There is an evident general tendency towards the 
rising number of CSR reports issued by Chinese corpora-
tions (Figure 1).
However, what is behind this increase in the num-
ber of the submitted reports just simple susceptibility to 
pressure from stakeholders and society as a whole and a 
corresponding reaction to it, or genuine changes in the 
philosophy of companies that lead to more appreciation 
of stakeholders’ perspectives (a main tenet of CSR) and 
as a consequence more devotion to transparent financial 
reporting? This paper is set to reveal this on a sample of 
Chinese public companies.
3. Research design
3.1. Data and sample selection
Our data come from China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) Database. We extracted from CSMAR 
an initial sample of over 30.000 firm-year observations 
from 2009 to 2019. After screening our sample from del-
isted and delisting warned as well as financial companies 
and firms with missing data we ended up with our final 
sample of 25,861 year-company observations, correspond-
ing to 3538 Chinese listed companies, covering the pe-
riod from 2009 to 2019. Table 2 shows the distribution 
of samples.
Table 2. Sample description: distribution of firm-year observations by industry





29 28 36 34 38 37 41 40 42 37 35 397 1.54
Mining industry 38 42 50 58 64 68 74 68 66 70 70 668 2.58
Manufacturing 860 881 1133 1370 1498 1507 1566 1677 1790 2106 2101 16489 63.76
Electricity, heat, 
gas and water 
production and 
supply
61 67 70 76 80 82 88 94 100 103 100 921 3.56
Construction 
industry 37 35 38 54 62 63 70 76 88 91 86 700 2.71
Wholesale and 
retail 88 98 110 143 152 145 145 141 151 156 156 1485 5.74
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In terms of year distribution, the observed value has 
steadily increased since 2009: from 1388 in 2009 to 3231 
in 2019, an increase of 232.78 per cent. From the per-
spective of industry distribution, the largest proportion is 
manufacturing (Obs = 16489), accounting for 63.76 per 
cent, followed by IT industry (Obs = 1550), accounting 
for about 5.99 per cent, and the third is wholesale and 
retail (Obs = 1485), accounting for about 5.74 per cent. 
The number of listed companies that issued CSR reports 
increased by 259.03 per cent from 2009 (371 reports) to 
2019 (961 reports). However, due to the faster growth rate 
of the number of listed companies, the proportion of listed 
companies that issued CSR reports did not change much 
and remained at around 30 per cent.
3.2. Measurement of variables
Dependent variable: Earning management. The previous 
literature used various tools to measure earnings manage-
ment, including Jones’ trailblazer model which set the 
scene of research into this direction (Jones, 1991), a model 
of operating cash flows and the formal accounting process 
developed by (Dechow et al., 1998), the real activities ma-
nipulation model proposed by (Roychowdhury, 2006), the 
model of accrual quality suggested by (Dechow & Dichev, 
2002) and nonlinear accruals models put forward by (Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2006), etc. 
Owing to its fine specification and less stringent data 
this study utilizes the Modified Jones Model proposed by 
(Dechow et al., 1996). Compatible with prior studies into 
this phenomenon (Almahrog et  al., 2018; Ben Amar & 
Chakroun, 2018; Choi et al., 2013; Gras-Gil et al., 2016; 
Muttakin et al., 2015), this paper makes use of the abso-
lute discretionary accruals as a proxy for the magnitude of 
earnings management.
For each year and industry, we estimate the following 
model:
, , ,
1 2 3 ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 ,i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
TA REV PPE
A A A A− − − −
     D
= α +α +α + e          
        (1)















48 56 88 97 121 122 137 173 212 248 248 1550 5.99
Real estate 85 116 119 135 134 136 133 121 117 115 109 1320 5.10
Leasing and 









pub lic facilities 
management 
industry
10 0 0 23 24 26 27 31 33 46 50 270 1.04
Resident servi-
ces, repairs and 
other services
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 0.05
Education 0 0 12 18 23 26 33 38 46 57 56 309 1.19
Health and 
social work 51 41 45 17 20 22 24 21 23 19 18 301 1.16
Total (Obs) 1388 1449 1799 2134 2342 2359 2469 2635 2823 3232 3231 25861 100.00
CSR 371 471 518 582 644 681 708 747 795 851 961 7329 –
CSR active 
companies, % 26.73 32.51 28.79 27.27 27.50 28.87 28.68 28.35 28.16 26.33 29.74 28.34 –
End of Table 2
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where: TAi,t = total accruals for a firm i at year t; DREVt = 
change in net revenues in year t from year t–1; DRECt = 
change in net receivables; PPEt = total property, plant, and 
equipment in period t; At–1= lagged total assets at the end 
of t–1 year.
After running equation (1) the regression coefficient is 
obtained, which is then brought into the next model (2):
, ,
, 1 2 3 ,
, 1 , 1 , 1
1ˆ ˆ ˆ .i t i ti t i t
i t i t i t
REV PPE
NDA
A A A− − −
     D
= α +α +α + e          
     
       (2)
Equation (2) provides us with non-discretionary ac-
cruals (NDA) and having calculated NDA we compute 










= − . (3)
Independent variable: CSR. This study measures CSR 
engagement resorting to dummy variable: if the company 
issued a CSR that year, the value is 1, otherwise, it is 0.
Control Variables. We use several variables to control 
the potential effect of corporate governance and firm-
specific circumstances that may impact the extent of EM. 
Some control variables may affect the level of earning 
management, so we add a set of control variables to the 
model. Control variables include enterprise size (LnSize), 
profitability (ROA), equity concentration (Top1), asset-
liability ratio (Leverage), and board size (BoardSize). Pre-
vious research has shown that these variables can have a 
significant impact on earnings management.
Empirical Model. To capture the association between 
earnings management and CSR engagement in financial 
reporting, we estimate the following model:
DAit = b0 + b1SusRptit + b2LnSizeit + b3ROAit +  
b4MTBit + b5Top1it + b6Dualityit + b7Industryit + 
b8BoardSizeit + b9Leverageit + Year + eit , (4)
where: ROA − the return on assets of the company i in 
year t; MTB − the company’s market-to-book ratio; Top1 − 
the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, which 
measures the concentration of shareholding; Industry − 
the industry code to which the company belongs with a 
value of 1–9, 11–19, whilst 10 is assigned to the financial 
industry, not included in this research; BoardSize − the 
number of people on the board of directors; Leverage − 
the ratio of liabilities to assets, and Year − the year of ob-
servation.
We summarize the definition and calculation meth-
ods of dependent, independent and control variables in 
Table 3.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics. Table 4 shows de-
scriptive statistics for all variables and t-test which shows 
the difference between CSR active and non-active com-
panies. Panel A of Table 4 shows a mean value of 0.012 
for DA, while the average value of CSR is 0.261, which 
means that only 26.1 per cent of the observations have 
issued sustainability reports, which is much lower com-
pared to European and American countries. Panel B of 
Table 4 shows that there is a significant difference in 
the average DA between CSR active and CSR inactive 
firms significant at the level of 10%. Moreover, Panel B 
of Table 4 testifies that CSR active firms are superior in 
terms of company size, profitability, the board size, and 
asset-liability ratio indicators. In contrast, CSR inactive 
firms have a higher market-to-book ratio than those of 
CSR active companies.
From Panel B of Table 4, we also see that the average 
DA of CSR active firms (0.016) is higher than that of CSR 
inactive firms (0.011), indicating that the former practice 
earning management more than the latter. 
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of the variables 
in the model. The highest correlation coefficients are ROA 
and ROE (0.884). Since ROE is a replacement variable for 
our robustness testing, a high correlation coefficient is 
auspicious for us. The explanatory variable CSR and the 
control variable LnSize have the highest correlation coeffi-
cient, which is 0.450, and the correlation coefficients with 
other control variables are relatively low.
We also run collinearity statistics resulted in the maxi-
mum value of VIF is 2.38 and the average value is 1.34, 








DA Calculated from formula 1, 2, 3
Independent variable
CSR Report CSR 0 = Not issuing Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report
1 = Issuing Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report
Control variables
BoardSize BoardSize Total number of board members
Firm Size LnSize Ln(Total assets)
Return On 
Assets
ROA Net profit/ Total assets
Return on 
Equity









Leverage Leverage Total liabilities / Total assets
Industry Industry The code of the company’s 
industry
Year Year Current Year
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics (source: authors’ calculations)
Panel A B  
VarName
Full Sample CSR = 0 CSR = 1
MeanDiff 
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
DA 25861 0.012 0.172 19118 0.011 0.183 6743 0.016 0.135 –0.004*
CSR 25861 0.261 0.439 19118 0 0 6743 1 0 –1
LnSize 25861 22.155 1.313 19118 21.804 1.068 6743 23.149 1.427 –1.345***
ROA 25860 0.039 0.064 19117 0.036 0.065 6743 0.045 0.06 –0.009***
ROE 25824 0.062 0.137 19084 0.055 0.141 6740 0.084 0.123 –0.029***
MTB 25189 3.675 3.402 18566 3.964 3.622 6623 2.864 2.519 1.100***
BoardSize 25817 8.668 1.76 19082 8.493 1.641 6735 9.164 1.976 –0.671***
Leverage 25861 0.441 0.213 19118 0.423 0.214 6743 0.491 0.199 –0.068***
Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table 5. Bivariate correlations results (source: authors’ calculations)
DA CSR LnSize ROA ROE MTB Industry BoardSize Leverage
DA 1
CSR 0.011* 1
LnSize 0.035*** 0.450*** 1
ROA 0.234*** 0.061*** 0.023*** 1
ROE 0.224*** 0.092*** 0.127*** 0.884*** 1
MTB –0.026*** –0.142*** –0.398*** –0.003 –0.096*** 1
Industry 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.076*** 0.021*** 0.024*** –0.001 1
BoardSize 0.013** 0.167*** 0.276*** 0.023*** 0.049*** –0.113*** 0.013** 1
Leverage –0.034*** 0.141*** 0.464*** –0.364*** –0.187*** 0.014** 0.086*** 0.157*** 1
Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
indicating that there is no multicollinearity problem be-
tween variables.
4.2. The relation between CSR and accrual-based 
earnings management
Table 6 presents the results of multivariate regression 
analyses of DA and robustness testing. The result (1) is 
a multiple regression analysis based on formula (4), and 
result (2) is the robustness test there instead of ROA we 
employ ROE.
The multivariate regression analyses bring the find-
ings, which are consistent with the opportunistic finan-
cial reporting hypothesis, as we find a positive associa-
tion between CSR engagement and the extent of earnings 
management. In particular, the estimated coefficient on 
DA_CSR is positive and significant (p < 0.10), denoting 
that CSR active firms operate earnings more through ac-
cruals. Therefore, in the Chinese institutional setting, the 
CSR engagement (proxy – the issuance of a CSR report) 
is positively associated with accrual-based earnings man-
agement. 
For the control variables, both MTB (−0.001) and 
BoardSize (−0.002) are negatively correlated with earn-
ings management and are significant at the 1% level. It is 
generally believed that MTB is negatively correlated with 
market value, that is, companies with higher market value 
have fewer earnings management. ROA (0.660), Leverage 
(0.038) and EM are positively correlated, and they are all 
significant at the 1% level. LnSize (0.002) is positively cor-
related with EM, which is significant at the 10% level.
Result (2) shows the robustness test results in which 
we replace ROA with ROE. In the robustness test, the 
coefficient and pole of DA-CSR association are the same 
as the result (1). Only the sign of the coefficient of the 
control variable Leverage is different, but it is not signifi-
cant. The results (3) and (4) in Table 6 are the first set of 
robustness tests and it could be noticed that the sign of 
the coefficients of each variable does not change after the 
addition of the variable StateOwn. Results (5) and (6) are 
robustness tests done to exclude endogeneity problems, 
using the instrumental variables (IV) techniques method, 
and analogous findings are obtained. Due to the limitation 
of the regression method (xtivreg2), we could not use Year 
directly in results (5) and (6), so we replicated a variable 
Year2 that is the same as Year. Similarly, neither (5) nor 
(6) output the variable _cons. The results of the robustness 
test show that the results of the empirical model and the 
robustness test model are similar and the model with its 
findings is reliable.
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Discussions and conclusions
This paper investigates the association between CSR ac-
tivities and the extent of earnings management in China. 
We examined these relationships using a sample of listed 
Chinese firms for the period 2009−2019. We measure 
earnings management by the level of discretionary ac-
cruals which unlike NDA are fully under the control of 
managers. 
We hypothesized that CSR active firms operate dis-
similarly from other firms in their financial reporting and 
that the CSR attitude of a company sways its reporting 
incentives in respect of the extent of earning management. 
We find that CSR firms indeed behave differently from 
CSR non-active firms in making accounting and operat-
ing decisions. However, contrary to our expectation that 
CSR firms would deliver more transparent financial in-
formation to investors we conclude that they deliver less 
transparent financial figures. We find a significant posi-
tive association between CSR activity and earning man-
agement assessed by the level of discretionary accruals in 
Chinese listed companies. Moreover, we document that 
Chinese CSR active firms engage more in earnings man-
agement through discretionary accruals than CSR inactive 
firms. Our findings are on par with those of (Gargouri 
et al., 2010; Muttakin et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2008) and 
lend further support to the opportunistic financial report-
ing hypothesis. We add value to the literature by focusing 
on China the country with growing importance in the 
world economy. We extend previous studies on the Chi-
nese institutional setting. 
In general, our study provides intriguing implications 
for the debate over the benefits of CSR activity. Our find-
ings give further credit to the suggestion that CSR ac-
tive firms should not be confused with socially respon-
sible firms (Foster, 2021). Mechanically carrying out CSR 
Table 6. Regression results and robustness tests (source: authors’ calculations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA DA DA DA DA DA
CSR
0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011** 0.009* 0.010*
(1.74) (1.95) (1.94) (2.17) (1.74) (1.95)
BoardSize
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.77) (0.80) (0.60) (0.62) (0.77) (0.80)
LnSize
0.020*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.025***








0.039** 0.048*** 0.019 0.026 0.039** 0.048***
(2.10) (2.59) (1.01) (1.33) (2.10) (2.59)
MTB
–0.002*** –0.001** –0.003*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.001**
(–4.83) (–2.16) (–5.20) (–2.60) (–4.83) (–2.16)
Leverage
0.011 –0.032*** 0.025* –0.015 0.011 –0.032***
(0.89) (–2.59) (1.94) (–1.21) (0.89) (–2.59)
Industry
–0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003***
(–4.03) (–4.22) (–4.05) (–4.24) (–4.03) (–4.23)
Year
–0.006*** –0.007*** –0.006*** –0.006***








12.540*** 14.181*** 10.847*** 12.218***
(11.48) (12.98) (9.35) (10.51)
N 25144 25144 25144 25144 25026 25026
r2 0.069 0.059 0.070 0.060 0.069 0.059
r2_a –0.084 –0.096 –0.083 –0.095 –0.079 –0.091
Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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activity without heeding to the stakeholders’ perspectives 
is meaningful and is a relic of the “ticking the box” men-
tality strongly rooted in the corporate world. We infer that 
earnings management is utilized by firms to impact con-
tractual relationships based on accounting numbers and 
accordingly to adjust financial reporting in pursuance of 
misleading stakeholders regarding a firm’s financial per-
formance (Gargouri et al., 2010). This practice we stress 
runs counter to the fundamental premises of CSR.  
Partially we could find a meaningful and logical ex-
planation for this behaviour. The chain of events begins 
with a CSR activity that requires additional costs to be 
incurred. These costs in turn reduce the financial perfor-
mance of the company, which incentivize managers to en-
gage in EM to smooth financial performance figures. Next 
explanation related to the multiple objectives hypothesis 
put forward by (Chih et al., 2008) “which contends that 
multiple objectives means no objective” (Chih et al., 2008, 
p. 182). Multiple objectives hypothesis postulates that 
satisfaction of a wider group of stakeholders other than 
shareholders engenders a lack of performance criteria with 
which to assess managers and it enables managerial dis-
cretion connected with EM (Chih et al., 2008; Gargouri 
et al., 2010). In other words, the multiple objectives hy-
pothesis presuppose that stakeholders might also insist on 
EM, thus this practice is justified.  We do not support such 
an approach and what we have proved is evidence that 
CSR active firms are not completely honest with society 
and with themselves. All in one our findings although run 
counter to reining transparent financial reporting hypoth-
esis although are congruent with prior study’s that “CSR is 
not a sufficient condition to get rid of earnings manage-
ment” (Scholtens & Kang, 2013, p. 108). 
We infer some important policy recommendations 
from our analysis, which are consequential for both in-
vestors and policymakers. Investors should not preemp-
tively infer that firms engaging in CSR activities, conduct 
ethically and provide transparent financial reports. As we 
document CSR active firms might as well and do manipu-
late earnings through discretionary accruals and accord-
ingly provide less transparent financial reports to inves-
tors and shareholders. Thus, overall our advice is that the 
credibility and authenticity of the company’s CSR policy 
should be appraised with caution. Likewise, CSR policies 
and regulations may unintentionally encourage opportu-
nistic behaviour, rather than pushing firms and incentiv-
izing them into social behaviour. Therefore, policymakers 
must exercise prudence about this opportunistic behav-
iour and strengthen monitoring to impose social compli-
ance. Maybe one way out of it is a kind of regulation that 
would link theory and practice. This regulation would em-
phasize and confirm that CSR reporting is practice-based 
and should be assessed footed in actual practice and not 
only be associated with vague reports aimed at confus-
ing stakeholders. However, the evidence collected by us 
may be of interest for a broad array of potential users, 
which are not limited solely to the academic community, 
investors and policymakers in particular for the financial 
reporting users, accounting standards-setting bodies and 
assurance practitioners.
The result of this study should be carefully interpreted 
as it has limitations that may be supplemented in future 
inquiries. First, this study employs dummy variable in re-
spect to CSR, while we believe that the quality of CSR 
reporting could sway the results in some way and explicate 
deeply the matter at hand. Next, as in any empirical analy-
sis, the results of this paper are exposed to measurement 
errors that might be inherent in the EM model used. A 
natural extension of our work is to target some distinct 
area of a company’s CSR to detect the most relevant 
stakeholders to whom the company heeded when it man-
ages its earnings. Moreover, it may be worth providing 
the analysis examining various sectors and institutional 
frameworks. Another element that we sense can open up 
new relationships is ownership concentration impact on 
EM. In conclusion, the creation of a more comprehen-
sive analytical model of earnings management that would 
somehow embody ethical considerations into it is the goal 
that should be dealt with in the upcoming investigations.
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